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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
the statute3 7 but, when carefully considered, is merely a liberal
interpretation of its terms. If, however, it is the legislative intent
that to kill a person, while driving an automobile in an intoxicated
condition, shall constitute manslaughter in the first degree, the statute
should be amended.
JOHN A. REAGAN, JR.
THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE TO PLEDGEES
AND PURCHASERS UNDER THE NEW YORK FACTORS' AcT.'
In a recent New York case,2 the plaintiff, a dealer engaged in
the business of buying and selling jewelry, delivered to another
dealer in the same business, a diamond ring. The dealer signed the
following memorandum: "These goods are sent for your inspection
and remain our property and are to be returned to us on demand.
Sale takes effect only from date of our approval of your selection."
The dealer pledged the ring with the defendant as security for a loan
of $125.00. The defendant advanced the money to the dealer in
good faith and without knowledge of the plaintiff's ownership. In
an action of replevin, against the pledgee, the validity of the pledge
under the New York Factors' Act,3 was set up as a defense. The
defendant attempted to show by parol that the ring was delivered to
the dealer for the purpose of sale to such customer as he could find;
and that he was merely obligated to return either the goods or the
proceeds. The plaintiff contended that these facts were inadmissible
under the parol evidence rule. Upon an agreed statement of facts,
the question was submitted to the Appellate Division,4 which held
that the evidence should have been excluded. The Court of Appeals
IN. Y. PENAL LAW (1909) §1050.
IN. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW (1909) §43.
2 Nelkin v. Provident Loan Society of N. Y., 265 N. Y. 393, 193 N. E.
245 (1934).IN. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW (1909) §43, subd. 1: Every factor or other
agent, entrusted with the possession of any bill of lading, custom-house permit,
or warehouseman's receipt for the delivery of any merchandise, and every such
factor or agent not having the documentary evidence of title, who shall be
intrusted with the possession of any merchandise for the purpose of sale, or as
a security for any advances to be made or obtained thereon, shall be deemed to
be true owner thereof, so far as to give validity to any contract made by such
agent with any other person, for the sale or disposition of the whole or any
part of such merchandise and any account receivable or other chose in action
created by sale or other disposition of such merchandise, for any money
advanced, or negotiable instrument or other obligation in writing given by
such other person upon the faith thereof.
'Nelkin v. Provident Loan Society, 241 App. Div. 875, 271 N. Y. Supp.
314 (2d Dept. 1934).
NOTES AND COMMENT
unanimously reversed the decision, holding that the defendant did
not come within the prohibition of the parol evidence rule, since he
took no rights under the written contract between the parties. The
defendant's claim rested, not on the authority to pledge given to the
dealer by his contract with the owner, but solely upon the protection
offered by statutes.
In the case of Green v. Wachs,5 upon which the Appellate Divi-
sion based its decision, and upon which the plaintiffs relied to sus-
tain their contention, the plaintiff, a dealer engaged in the business
of buying and selling diamonds, delivered certain jewels to one
Vollman, engaged in the same business. The memorandum,6 signed
at the time of delivery, is almost identical in language with that used
in the Nelkin case. Vollman delivered a ring to another dealer,
Cohen, who in turn delivered it to Arnow. Arnow sold it to the
defendants, who purchased it for value, without notice of the con-
tract between Green and Vollman. In an action for replevin, the
defense set up, was the validity of the defendants' title, based upon
the authority of Vollman to transfer title. The defendant offered
to explain the written instrument by showing a custom of the trade,
that brokers or dealers, such as Vollman, under similar circumstances,
had authority and were expected to sell the jewelry so consigned
to them and remit after receiving the price from their customers.
The Court of Appeals decided that the evidence should have been
excluded, on the ground that the ,written agreement was clear and
unambiguous and could not be varied by parol testimony.
These decisions can best be reconciled upon analysis of the parol
evidence rule and the nature of the rights asserted in each case. The
rule which excludes any proof, tending to vary, alter, or change the
meaning of a written instrument, binds only those persons Who are
creating or receiving rights through the writing.7 The principle
is lucidly expounded by Professor Wigmore, as follows: 8
"The theory of the rule is that the parties have deter-
mined that a particular document shall be made the sole em-
bodiment of their legal act for certain purposes. Hence, so
far as that effect and those purposes are concerned, they must
be found in the writing and nowhere else. But, so far as
other effects and purposes are concerned, the writing has not
superseded their other conduct, nor other persons' conduct,
and it may still be resorted to for any other purpose."
'254 N. Y. 437, 173 N. E. 575 (1930).
'The memorandum read as follows: "These goods are sent for your
inspection and remain the property of Henry Green and are to be returned on
demand. Sale takes effect only from date of approval of your selection, and a
bill rendered. 1 Em. Cut Dia. in ring 13.40 $12,500-Stone Net. (Signed)
Felix B. Vollman."
, O'TooLE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (1934) 631.
8 5 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) §2446 and cases cited in n. 5.
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The question as to whether the defendants in these actions based
their rights upon the legal effect and purpose embodied in the writ-
ing is best answered by an examination of their rights as they ex-
isted under the common law. The common law had, from its earli-
est days, firmly grasped the theory that a man cannot convey better
title than he has.9 Accordingly, one who purchased property from
a thief 10 or from one who had acquired possession fraudulently with-
out any intention on the part of the owner to part with title," or
from a mere bailee, 12 took no valid title as against the true owner;
and this was so even though he had parted with value without notice
of the true owner's rights.
The early exceptions to the rigidity of the common law rule,
seemed to have developed from the law merchant and from equity.13
The former manifested its influence in the rules applicable to the
purchase of negotiable paper; 14 the latter, in the operation of the
doctrine of estoppel.15 These exceptions arose because of the in-
compatibility of the rule with the proper workings of the mechanism
of commerce. "The old rules in market overt * * *," says Holds-
worth,' 6 "are an early illustration of this truth, and the growth of the
law as to negotiable instruments and the statutory modifications of
the law as to factors, and as to vendors and purchasers of goods,
have introduced other similar modifications. In all these cases, the
man who gets a good title, notwithstanding the defects in title of
the person from whom he acquired, may be said to get his ownership,
partially at any rate, by virtue of a special rule of law statutory or
otherwise."
Were the rights of the pledgee in the Nelkin case rights which
he would have enjoyed under the common law, or were they rights
created by virtue of a special statutory rule?
At common law, a factor is an agent, intrusted by his principal
with possession of merchandise for the purpose of sale.17 In Eng-
land, as early as 1743,18 the rule was expressed that the authority
of a factor to sell merchandise intrusted to his possession, could not
be stretched to include the authority to pledge the same for his own
benefit. This principle has been adopted and adhered to in this
country. 19
9 7 HoLDSWoRTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 510.
"0Basset v. Spofford, 45 N. Y. 387 (1871).
Schmidt v. Simpson, 204 N. Y. 434, 97 N. E. 966 (1912).
Smith v. Clews, 114 N. Y. 387, 21 N. E. 160 (1889).
"WHITNEY, OuTLiNE OF LAW OF SALES 143.
"Ibid.
"Id. at 144.
16 7 HoLDSwoRTH, loc. cit. supra note 9.
"25 C. J. 340.
"Paterson v. Tash, 2 Strange 1178 (K. B. 1743).
"9 2 KENT, CO.MMENTARIES 625, 626: "Though a factor may sell and bind
his principal, he cannot pledge the goods as security for his own debt; not
even though there be the formality of a bill of parcels and a receipt. The
principal may recover the goods of the pawnee; and his ignorance that the
NOTES AND COMMENT
This common law principle is modified by the Factors' Act.
"The act was intended to modify and make certain (in the practical
application to the current transactions of trade and commerce) the
general common law rule, that where one of two innocent persons
must suffer loss from the act of a third person, such loss shall be
borne by him who has placed the third person in the position which
enabled him to do the act causing a loss." 20 Accordingly, a factor's
possession under the Factors' Act is such evidence of ownership as
to third persons, who advance money upon the faith of such posses-
sion, as to enable the factor to do all acts. 21 Four requisites exist
for the application of the protection afforded to a third person under
the act:
1. The agent must have been intrusted 22 with the possession
of documentary evidence of title, or with possession of
merchandise for the purpose of sale or pledge.23
2. The agent must have actual authority to sell, as distin-
guished from apparent authority, upon which rests the
doctrine of estoppel. 24
3. The purchaser must advance money upon the faith of the
factors' possession without notice of the true owner's
rights.25
4. The pledge or sale must not have been made as security
for or in consideration of a past indebtedness.
26
Thus, under the Factors' Act, an owner is left to use his pre-
cautions when he selects an agent; 27 and the act of endowing an
agent with the possession of merchandise and the authority to sell
the same is deemed equivalent to entrusting him with disposing con-
trol, regardless of the actual intention of the owner as manifested
in his contract with the agent.2 8 The Act, therefore, has been held
to afford protection to a pledgee from a factor, where the factor
merely had authority to sell. 29 The rights of the pledgee do not
depend upon the intention of the principal to relinquish his title, but
factor held the goods in the character of factor is no excuse. * * * To pledge
the goods of the principal is beyond the scope of the factor's power."
'0 Cartwright v. Wilmerding, 24 N. Y. 521, 526 (1862).
"lid. at 532.
'WHITNEY, OUTLINE OF SALES 149, and cases cited in n. 436.
N. Y. PERs. PROP. LAW §43, subd. 1.
Smith v. Clews, supra note 12.
Canales v. Earl, 168 N. Y. Supp. 726 (1918).
N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW §43, subd. 2; De Beixedon v. Brown and Sec-
comb, 188 N. Y. Supp. 451 (1921).
1 Cartwright v. Wilmerding, supra note 20; Freudenheim v. Gutter, 201
N. Y. 94, 94 N. E. 640 (1911).
I Cartwright v. Wilmerding, supra note 20.
1 Note (1913C) ANY. CAs. 1290.
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upon the interpretation which the statute places upon his conduct.
The written contract, therefore, between the principal and agent,
would not supersede the other conduct of the parties for the purpose
of bringing the agent within the language and intent of the Factors'
Act.8 0
In the Green case the defendant rested upon his common law
rights. He justified the sale upon the theory that the agent had au-
thority to sell and was carrying out that authority, thus relying upon
the common law rule that a principal is liable for the authorized acts
of his agent.31 Whether the act of the agent was authorized, was
necessarily dependent upon the legal act of the parties as embodied
in the written contract. Therefore, the contract could not be varied
by parol evidence.
Whether the defendant in the Green case (supra) could have
availed himself of the protection afforded by the Factors' Act was
not discussed in the court's opinion. It is the writer's view that it
could have been. If we assume that the defendant's contention that
Vollman had authority to sell is correct, it is clear that Vollman
abused that authority by delegating it to the discretion of another.32
However, having so delegated his trust, in violation of his authority
as an agent, the statute makes him a principal as to all the acts pei-
formed by his sub-agent.38 Vann. J., states in the case of Freuden-
heim v. Gutter: 84 "Nor is it answered by saying' that Levisohn
could not have made it [the wrongful pledge] through Feinberg,
upon the principle of delegatus non potest delagare because that prin-
ciple does not apply to a dishonest agent within the meaning of the
Factors' Act, which treats the agent as the owner. An agent cannot
delegate his trust but the statute does not regard the dishonest agent
as acting as an agent; but in his own behalf as principal, so far as
third persons are concerned."
If Vollman, then, was intrusted with possession of merchandise
for the purpose of sale and in abuse of his authority to sell delegated
that authority to another as a result of which the sale to the defen-
dant was made, and the proceeds converted by Vollman's agent to
his own use, the statute affords the defendant a protection not af-
forded him under the common law. This protection does not depend
upon the intention of the owner as manifested in his written con-
tract with Vollman, but is dependent solely upon the meaning which
the statute places upon the owne-r's conduct. Hence, if the court
had applied the Factors' Act to the facts in the Green case, that case
would have been exactly parallel with the Nelkin case. In distin-
1' 5 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE §2446, supra note 8.
2 C. J. 832, and n. 30.
2 C. J. 685: "The general rule is that an agent in whom is reposed trust
and confidence or who is required to exercise discretion or judgment may not
intrust performance of his duties to another without the consent of his
principal."
"Freudenheim v. Gutter, supra note 27.
'AId. at 102.
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guishing the Green case from the Nelkin case, the court states in
the latter: "No claim under the Factors' Act was made in that case.
Defendant asserted full title and benefit of his bargain on the theory
that the agent under his contract with the principal had complete
authority to sell and pass title. That was the only issue on the trial.
Concededly the defendant was claiming in privity with the agent." 35
The court implies, therefore, that if the claim under the Factors' Act
had been made, the case might have been differently decided.
In the writer's opinion, the application of the statutory principle
was not waived by the inadvertence of the defendant in not claiming
under it. Is the Factors' Act a substantive rule of law, of which
the courts may take cognizance when it applies to the facts pre-
sented, or is it a rule of law such as that contained in the Statute of
Frauds, which must be affirmatively pleaded in order to affect the
rights of the parties? 31 In the case of the latter, the defense has
been held to be a personal one which may be waived by the defen-
dant, and unless he sets up the statute and relies on it by some proper
pleading he impliedly waives the defense.37 Generally, substantive
law is considered to be that part of the law which creates, defines,
and regulates rights as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which
prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtaining redress for
their invasion.3 8 The rule under the Factors' Act would by its
nature seem to come within the former classification.
The fact that the court did not invoke the rule of law contained
in the Factors' Act is not sufficient, however, to lay it open to criti-
cism. It is not mandatory upon the courts to instruct the parties as
to the theory upon which to present their case. Generally, the theory
upon which a case is tried in the court below is adhered to on appeal.3 9
Where the interests of public policy are not subserved by acting
otherwise, it is not mandatory upon the court to invoke rights for
the parties which they themselves have inadvertently overlooked.
PAULINE KAPLAN.
PowER OF A COURT OF EQUITY To ASCERTAIN AND AWARD
PERMANENT DAMAGES IN LIEU OF INJUNCTION.
The Court of Appeals, in the case of Cox v. N. Y. Central R. R.
Co.,' which was decided in the latter part of 1934, created a rule of
law, the importance of which cannot be too greatly stressed.
C Nelkin v. Provident Loan Society of N. Y., supra note 2.
3025 R. C. L. 742.
37 Ibid.
, Mix v. Board of Commissioners of Nez Perce County, 18 Idaho 695,
112 Pac. 215 (1910).
'2 R. C. L. 79.
1265 N. Y. 411, 193 N. E. 251 (1934).
